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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GILBERT LORETTO,
Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v.

:

HENRY GALETKA, Warden,

:

Respondent/Appellee.

Case No, 981831-CA

Priority No. 3

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that all of
petitioner's claims were procedurally barred because he could and
should have raised them on his direct appeal?
The Court reviews for correctness the legal conclusions
underlying the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief.

Wright

v. Carver,

886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Former rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is attached
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as addendum A.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state charged petitioner with being a party to an
aggravated robbery (R. 396) . A jury convicted petitioner as
charged, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to the
statutory five-years-to-life prison term (R. 398). This Court
affirmed the conviction on direct appeal.

State v.

Loretto,

slip. op. 960622-CA (attached as addendum B).
Petitioner challenged the conviction in a petition for postconviction relief (R. 1-72).

The trial court dismissed the

petition without a hearing, finding all of petitioner's claims
procedurally barred (R. 455-56) (attached as addendum C ) .
Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 458-59).
Pursuant to petitioner's request, this Court has accepted
his Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief as petitioner's
brief on appeal.2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State detailed the historical facts in its brief on
direct appeal.

Because they have little relevance to this

x

As a result of amendments subsequent to the filing of the
petition in this case, rule 65C now provides for the relief
petitioner sought.
2

A11 references to "Appellant's Brief" refer to this
memorandum.
2
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appeal, respondent will not repeat them here.
In his direct appeal, petitioner raised five challenges to
his conviction: 1) the trial court should have quashed the jury
panel based on a prospective juror's voir dire comments about
Mexican gang members; 2) the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction as an accomplice to an aggravated robbery; 3) the
trial court erroneously gave repetitious aggravated robbery
instructions; 4) the trial court gave an improper reasonable
doubt instruction; and 5) the trial court erroneously denied
petitioner's motion for a continuance.

State v. Loretto,

op. 960622-CA (Utah App. August 14, 1997.
five claims in an unpublished decision.

slip

The Court rejected all
Id.

In his petition and amended petition for post-conviction
relief, petitioner attacked his aggravated robbery conviction on
the following grounds: 1) the prosecutor allegedly withheld
police reports of interviews with the co-defendant; 2) the
prosecutor allegedly presented false or misleading testimony; 3)
the State produced insufficient evidence to establish that
petitioner acted as an accomplice; 4) the State subjected
petitioner to selective prosecution; and 5) the State used an
impermissibly suggestive photo identification procedure because
he was the only person in the photo array with a spider tattoo on
his neck (R. 17-70, 353-63).

Petitioner offered no explanation

why he did not include these claims in the direct appeal.

3
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Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, contending that
the claims were procedurally barred because petitioner could have
raised them on direct appeal and had neither alleged nor
established unusual circumstances for his failure to do so (R.
394).

Petitioner did not respond to the motion, and the post-

conviction court granted it (R. 455-56).
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition.

In this

appeal, petitioner claims: 1) a prospective juror's statements
about Mexican gang members tainted the entire panel; 2) the State
produced insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
participating in the aggravated robbery; 3) the trial court
erroneously gave an Allen

instruction; 4) the trial court -refused

a jury instruction that presented his theory of the case; 5) the
trial court erroneously denied his counsel's requested
continuance; and 6) the trial court and jury were biased.
Appellant's Brief at 5-13.

In addition, petitioner alleges for

the first time that his trial and appellate counsel performed
deficiently in handling his sufficiency and biased court and jury
claims.

Appellant's Brief at 1-5, 9.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court correctly concluded that all of petitioner's
claims were procedurally barred.

Petitioner offered no

justification for failing to raise them on direct appeal.
Consequently, he failed to meet his burden to show that unusual

4
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circumstances justified hearing his post-conviction claims, and
the trial court correctly applied the procedural bar.
On appeal, petitioner has established no error in this
ruling.

To the contrary, petitioner relies on claims he never

presented to the post-conviction court.

Raising claims on appeal

that he did not raise in the post-conviction court does not
establish that the lower court erroneously found the claims
before it procedurally barred.
ARGUMENT
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS WERE PROCEDURALLY BARRED, AND
PETITIONER'S RELIANCE ON CLAIMS HE NEVER RAISED IN THE
POST-CONVICTION COURT AND ON CLAIMS ALREADY REJECTED ON
THE DIRECT APPEAL DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE CONTRARY
The trial court correctly concluded that petitioner's claims
were procedurally barred.

Utah law clearly precludes using a

petition for post-conviction relief to raise claims that could
and should have been raised on direct appeal.
Van Der Veur,

See, e.g., Webb v.

853 P.2d 898, 899 (Utah App.), cert, denied,

P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).

860

A petitioner may avoid this procedural bar

by establishing that unusual circumstances excuse his failure to
raise the otherwise barred claim in the direct appeal.

Id.

The petition included no excuse for petitioner's failure to
raise his post-conviction claims on direct appeal (R. 1-71).
When respondent moved to dismiss the petition because
petitioner's claims were procedurally barred, petitioner again

5
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failed to come forward with any justification for failing to
raise the claims on direct appeal (R. 453 (October 21, 1998
minute entry indicating that petitioner filed no response to
respondent's motion to dismiss)).

On this record, the post-

conviction court correctly concluded that all of the claims were
procedurally barred and correctly dismissed the petition.
On appeal, petitioner identifies no error in this ruling.
Instead, petitioner belatedly alleges that his counsel performed
deficiently on his direct appeal (Appellant's Brief at 1-5, 9)
and abandons all but one of the claims he raised in his postconviction petition in favor of claims that he already litigated
in his direct appeal (Appellant's Brief at 5-13).3
Petitioner alleges for the first time on appeal that his
counsel performed ineffectively.

Admittedly, prior counsel's

constitutionally deficient performance may avoid the procedural
See, e.g.,

bar.

cert, denied,

Gardner

v. Holden,

516 U.S. 828 (1995).

888 P.2d 608, 615 (Utah),
However, petitioner cannot

wait until his post-conviction appeal to argue ineffective
assistance of counsel in order to avoid the procedural bar
enforced by the court below.

Cf., e.g., Edgell

v.

Canning,

97 6

P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999) (refusing to address an issue raised
for the first time on appeal).

3

The only claim included in both the petition and appeal is
petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
6
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In any event, petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are facially meritless.

In order to establish that

counsel performed deficiently, petitioner must identify specific
acts and omissions by counsel that fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and overcome a strong presumption that
counsel performed reasonably.

See, e.g., Parsons

P.2d 516, 521-22 (Utah), cert, denied,

v. Barnes,

871

513 U.S. 966 (1994).

Petitioner's arguments do not satisfy this burden.
Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for not
raising a sufficiency claim in the direct appeal.
Brief at 5.

The argument misstates the record.

Appellant's
Appellate

counsel raised a sufficiency claim in the direct appeal, and this
Court rejected it.

State v. Loretto,

slip op. 960622 at 2 (Utah

App. August 14, 1999).
Petitioner's other two ineffectiveness claims appear to
allege that he was denied his right to conflict-free counsel.

In

order to succeed on this claim, petitioner must establish both
that his appellate counsel had an actual conflict of interest,
and that the conflict affected her performance.

See,

v. Lovell,

Petitioner has

368 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999).

e.g., State

established neither part of this test.
In order to establish that an actual conflict existed,
petitioner must establish that counsel had to make choices that
would advance her interests over petitioner's.

Id.

Petitioner

7
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first faults his counsel for not raising his claim that he was
tried before a biased judge and jury (Point VI).
Brief at 5.

Appellant's

In support, petitioner alleges only that his trial

and appellate attorneys' role as officers of the court would make
them reluctant to raise the claim.

Id.

Petitioner's allegation is frivolous.

If petitioner's

allegation established a conflict of interest for Sixth Amendment
purposes, all defense counsel would have a conflict of interest
because all counsel serve the dual function of advocate and
officer of the court.
As to his sufficiency claim, petitioner contends "it is
quite

possible

that the ineffective representation of Mr. Loretto

was caused by the fact that the Salt Lake Legal Defenders
association is curtailed by the State government from fully and
zealously representing defendant because of loyalties owed to the
Third (3d) Parties (e.g. the Prosecution Council and the Utah
Department of Corrections)/'

Appellant's Brief at 9 (emphasis

added) . This allegation merely speculates about possible divided
loyalties.

It does nothing to establish that counsel in any way

advanced her interests to the detriment of petitioner's
Petitioner also has not shown that any conflict affected his
counsel's performance.

Admittedly, counsel did not raise on

direct appeal a that petitioner was tried before a biased judge
and jury.

However, petitioner offers nothing other than his mere

8
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conclusion that the omission resulted from an actual conflict of
interest,4
Petitioner similarly fails to establish that any conflict
affected how counsel presented the sufficiency claim.

To the

contrary, petitioner merely repeats the same sufficiency argument
in this appeal that his counsel made on the direct appeal.
Appellant's Brief at 7-9.
Petitioner also grounds his appeal on five claims that he
never presented to the post conviction court.5

Raising new

claims on appeal does not establish that the post-conviction
court erroneously found that the claims presented to it were
procedurally barred.
Moreover, all the claims petitioner raises in this appeal
are clearly procedurally barred; the substance of each was fully
and fairly litigated on the direct appeal.

A petitioner may not

re-litigate in a post-conviction petition issues that the Court
has already disposed of on direct appeal.

See, e.g., Wright

v.

4

To support this claim, petitioner refers back to the other
five claims he raised on this appeal. Appellant's Brief at 9.
As detailed below, counsel raised the substance of all five of
those claim on the direct appeal.
D

The petition did not include petitioner's appellate claims
that: 1) a prospective juror's comments about Mexican gang
members tainted the panel (Point I); 2) the trial court gave an
Allen instruction (Point III); 3) the trial court refused an
instruction on petitioner's theory of the case (Point IV; 4) the
trial court should have granted petitioner's requested
continuance (Point V); and 5) the trial court and jury were
biased (Point VI).
9
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Carter,

886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994); Webb v.

P.2d at 899.

Van Der Veur,

853

This Court already rejected petitioner's claims

that prospective juror Bingham's comments about the dress of
Mexican gang members tainted the jury panel, that the State
produced insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and
that the trial court erroneously denied a requested continuance.
State v. Loretto,

slip op. 960622-CA (Utah App. August 14, 1997).

The Court rejected the substance of petitioner's
instruction claim on the direct appeal.

Allen

In Point III, petitioner

contends that the trial court erroneously gave "verdict urging
*Allen' instructions."

Appellant's Brief at 9.

"When a jury

informs the trial court that they are having difficulty agreeing,
the court may underscore the case's importance, urge the jury to
reach an agreement, and send them back for further
deliberations."

State v.

1998) (citing Allen

v.

Clements

United

States,

967 P.2d 957, 959 (Utah App.
164 U.S. 492 (1896)).

However, such instructions are appropriate only if, in context,
they are not coercive.
Clements

Id.

clarifies that the analysis is triggered only when

the jury announces that it is deadlocked, or, at least, having
difficulty reaching a verdict.

Id.

Petitioner does not argue

that the jury in his criminal trial made such an announcement.
Instead, petitioner merely repeats the argument the Court already
rejected that the trial court erroneously gave more than one
10
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aggravated robbery instruction.

Appellant's Brief at 9-11.

Similarly, the Court rejected the substance of petitioner's
claim that the trial court refused to instruct on his theory of
the case.

In Point IV, petitioner asserts that the trial court

erroneously declined a "reasonable alternative" instruction.
Appellant's Brief at 11-12.

Petitioner presented this same

argument on direct appeal as part of his contention that the
trial court gave an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction.
Specifically, petitioner argued that his proffered "reasonable
alternative hypothesis" instruction better defined reasonable
doubt (R. 434-37).

The Court rejected petitioner's challenge to

the reasonable doubt instructions.
960622-CA at 2.

State v. Loretto,

slip- op.

Re-badging already litigated and rejected claims

does not revive them for purposes of post-conviction relief.
Gardner

v. Holden,

888 P.2d at 616 ("the attempt to avoid a prior

ruling by a hair-splitting distinction in the statement of the
issue does not invoke Rule 65B or habeas jurisdiction").
Finally, petitioner's claim that he was tried before a
biased judge and jury also fails.

To support that claim,

petitioner merely refers to other claims in his current appellate
brief.

Appellant's Brief at 13.

Those claims are procedurally

barred because they were fully and fairly litigated on direct
appeal.

Petitioner cannot obtain merits review of a claim that

is merely derivative of procedurally barred claims.

11
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CONCLUSION
Because petitioner offered no justification to the postconviction court for omitting his post-conviction claims from the
direct appeal, the post-conviction court correctly applied the
procedural bar and correctly dismissed the petition.

On appeal,

petitioner has established no error in applying the procedural
bar.

Therefore, the Court should affirm the dismissal of the

petition.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ZA

day of

\^A-Xr

im
JAN GRAHAM
httoje&ey General
^S BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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Rule 65B

UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE

222

granted. Birch Creek Irrigation Y. Prothero,
858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Inunctions sion of water by municipal corporation or pub§§ 10,14, 48 to 52,69 et seq., 265, 296 to 303, lie utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426.
310 to 316.
Preliminary mandatory injunction to preOJ.S 43 CJ.S. Injunctiona H 8,16,22 to vent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting
24, 36 et seq.; 43A CJ.S. Injunctions SS 165, practices, 49 A.LR.3d 1239.
166, 180, 206, 208.
What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying
AJLR. — Infant's employment contract, en- .refusal to honor, or injunction against honorfbrceability of covenant not to compete in, 17 ing, letter of credit under UCC § 5-114(1), (2),
A.L.R 3d 333.
25 A.L.R.4th 239.
Appealability of contempt adjudication or
Recovery of damages resulting from wrongconviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448.
fill
issuance of injunction as limited to amount
Review other than by appeal or writ of error, of bond, 30 A.L R.4th 273.
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject
Right of employee to injunction preventing
to, 33 A.L.R.3d 589.
employer from exposing employee to tobacco
Propriety of permanently enjoining one smoke in workplace, 37 A.L.R.4th 480.
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from Propriety of federal court injunction against
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 831.
question, 38 AX.R.3d 572.
Key Numbers, — Injunction *• 9 et seq.,
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver- 143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213.

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and
the failure to exercise such authority)* There shall be no special form of writ.
The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful imprisonment
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of
confinement.
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is
located.
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment.
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Rule 65B

(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts en the basis of which
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of
the commitment;
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and,
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and
the results of the review;
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached,
the petition shall state why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On thefilingof the petition,
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the
presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who
issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have already been abjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition is notfrivolouson its face, the court
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney.
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of lie case. Upon motion
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rule 65B

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

224

for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise
be present in court during the proceeding.
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was
originally chargecl.
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those
courts.
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule,
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has
been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant
relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is
occurring.
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the
restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so,
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that
abjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been
abdicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in
the petition shall appearfrivolouson its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim isfrivolouson
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to
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the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of
the order of dismissal.
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to
prohibit the courtfromruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive
motion.
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removedfromthe court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been
named as respondent in the action.
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction,
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with
according to law.
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to berestrainedor shall
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the
petition, if enough iB stated to impart the meaning and intent of the
proceeding to the respondent.
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may,
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (d). Any person who
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petitionfiledby
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be
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brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided
for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, whether civil or military, afranchise,or an office in a corporation
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights,
privileges or franchises.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On thefilingof a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may
petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has refused the petitioner the use or eiyoyment of a right or office to
which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance
with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This role
represents a complete reorganization of the for*
mer rule. This rule also revises parts of the
former rule dealing with habeas corpus and
post-conviction remedies. The rule applies generally to proceedings that are necessitated by
the absence of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the court. After the rule's introductory paragraph, each subsequent paragraph is intended to deal with a separate type
of proceeding. Thus, subparagraph (b) deals
with proceedings involving wrongful imprisonment; subparagraph (c) deals with proceedings
involving other types of wrongful restraint on
personal liberty; paragraph (d) deals with proceedings involving the wrongful use of public

or corporate authority; and paragraph (e) deals
with proceedings involving the wrongful use of
judicial authority or the failure to exercise
such authority. To the extent that the special
procedures set forth in these paragraphs do not
cover specific procedural issues that arise during a proceeding, the normal rules of civil procedure will apply.
This rule effectively eliminates the concept
of the "writ" from extraordinary relief procedure. In the view of the advisory committee,
the concept was used inconsistently and
confusingly in the former rule, and there waa
disagreement among judges and lawyers as to
what it meant in actual practice. The concept
has been replaced with terms such as "hearing
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FILED
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State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 960622-CA

v.
Gilbert Loretto,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(August 14, 1997)

Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys:

Lisa J. Remal and Rebecca Hyde, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Orme.
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This court has determined that lf[t]he facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and
the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO QUASH JURY PANEL
In some cases, there exists a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice, which requires the prosecution to prove the defendant
was not prejudiced. See, e.g.. State v. Swain. 835 P.2d 1009,
1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). However, in this case, Loretto bears
the burden of showing that prejudice resulted from the rather
confusing statements made by Ms. Bingham during voir dire.
Although defendant has offered an interpretation of Ms. Bingham's
statements in conjunction with a theory of how they could have
prejudiced him, we conclude that defendant has not shown that Ms.
Bingham's comments prejudiced him, especially in light of the
jurors1 response to the trial court's subsequent voir dire. We
therefore reject Loretto1s challenge to the trial court's denial
of his motion to quash the entire jury panel.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Loretto and the third man flanked the armed man in the
group. Each man stood only a foot away from Flores in the dark
parking lot, in this formation, the three men stood close enough
to Flores to grab her if she tried to escape. The position of
each of the men suggests a planned confrontation, or at least a
concerted effort by all three men to rob Flores. As such, we
conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, is not "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Loretto, with the
necessary mental state, encouraged or intentionally aided the
armed man in the commission of the robbery. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-202 (1995); State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah
1993) .
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY INSTRUCTION
Instruction 13 requires the State to prove that the conduct
with which Loretto was charged was prohibited, and thus explains
why the next two instructions define what constitutes prohibited
conduct. Instruction 16 gives the statutory definition of
accomplice liability. Instruction 17 and 18 then clarify that
the jury must only consider Loretto1s role in the robbery and
that Loretto1s mere presence was not enough to convict him of
accomplice liability. Thus, when the instructions are read
together, they do not overemphasize the elements of robbery or
detract from the issue of whether Loretto was an accomplice.
Instead, the instructions accurately state the law and emphasize
to the jury what it must find for Loretto to be guilty on a
theory of accomplice liability.
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
This court and the Utah Supreme Court have specifically held
that the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case is "an
appropriate statement of Utah law." State V, Robertson. 932 P.2d
1219, 1232 (Utah 1997); State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 1328, 1332
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In addition, in Robertson, the supreme
court specifically rejected the argument that the trial court
instead should have presented the jury with an instruction that
included a generalized reference to a reasonable alternative
hypothesis. See 932 P.2d at 1233. Therefore, based on stare
decisis, we reject Loretto1s argument. £&£. State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393, 399 n.2 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115, 115
S. Ct. 910 (1995).
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DENIAL OF MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
Loretto has never met his burden of establishing on the
record that the sought-after witness could be produced or that
the witness's testimony was relevant. See state v. Linden. 761
P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, Loretto has never even
established that the potential witness's testimony would be
helpful to Loretto. As a result, Loretto has not shown that he
"was materially prejudiced by the [trial] court's denial of the
continuance or that the trial result would have been different
had the continuance been granted." State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d
474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Loretto's
motion for a continuance. Seefftatev. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408,
413 (Utah 1993) (stating appellate court will not reverse trial
court's denial of motion for continuance absent clear abuse of
discretion).
Affirmed.

Michael J. Wilkins,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

^Judith M. Billings, Judge

Orme, Judge
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ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O. Box 140854
160 E. 300 S. ,6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

PILEP HISTRICT COURT
T H , ! * - • -CAL DISTRICT

NOV 1 2 »98
t:

SALTISKE^U^^'

BY DEPUTY CLERK J .

S \ « ^ — * - -

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GILBERT LORETTO,

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Petitioner,

Case No. 970910469
STATE OF UTAH,
Judge Frank G. Noel
Respondent.

The above-captioned matter came before the Court on respondent's
September 18,1998 motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner did
not respond to the motion to dismiss. After reviewing the file, the Court concludes as
follows:
1.

A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for direct appeal

and cannot be used to circumvent regular appellate review. A petitioner waives issues that
could have been raised on direct appeal from a conviction unless the petitioner establishes
unusual circumstances that justify the failure to previously raise them.
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2.

Petitioner could and should have raised all of his current issues on

direct appeal, and has failed to allege or demonstrate unusual circumstances which justify
his failure to do so. Accordingly, petitioner's post-conviction claims are procedurally
barred.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
1.

Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted.

2.

The petition is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

/ ^ ~ d a y of November, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOE
Third District Court . ""• ~'J
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing unsigned
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF postage prepaid,
this_ t 3G-T5ay of October, 1998, to:

Gilbert Loretto #25347
Utah State Prison
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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